The business case for the full original HS2 scheme from London to the North West and the North East was judged “High” in Value for Money terms by government with a Business to Cost ratio of around 2, ie benefits would be twice the cost. It was worth doing and it is still worth doing.
Timeline - On the way up
It was January 2009 that Labour established HS2 Ltd to examine the case for a new high speed rail line. Consultation followed in December 2010 on a route from London to Birmingham with a Y shaped extension to Manchester and Leeds published by the then Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government.
Justine Greening, Transport Secretary announced the go ahead for the project in January 2012, despite concerns over high cost and the environmental impact of construction, particularly in Buckinghamshire. The parliamentary Bill followed in November 2013 with the Supreme Court quickly rejecting outstanding appeals by opponents of the scheme.
A budget of £55.7Bn was allocated in November 2015. The Bill for Phase 1 to Birmingham received Royal Assent in February 2017.
Timeline - On the way down
As early as June 2016 the National Audit Office warned HS2 was under financial strain and could be delayed by a year.
HS2 Chairmen started to resign, Simon Kirby in 2016, Sir Terry Morgan in 2018 with the Conservative government commissioning a review into whether and how HS2 should continue, led by another former HS2 Ltd chairman, Sir Douglas Oakervie. At that time HS2 said that the railway may not be completed until 2040 and it would cost £88bn. In January 2020 Oakervie’s review said £106bn!
Prime Minister, Boris Johnson gave HS2 the go ahead in February 2020, despite what were described as “exploded costs”, not the wisest of decisions given such cost uncertainty! The budget was reset at £44.6bn for Phase 1 with the full network in a revised range of £72-98bn.
And it goes on - the delivery of HS2 was given a high risk warning by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) in July 2020. And yes, Boris Johnson marks the project’s formal beginning of construction in September 2020.
Cost pressures continued rising by £13bn by October 2021, and yet the government pressed on with the Bill for Phase 2 to Manchester, laid in parliament in January 2022, hailed as a “landmark moment” by Transport Secretary Grant Shapps.
A project in trouble
I think we all, except possibly the former Prime Minister, got the message by now. This was a project in trouble. Costs and delivery timescales continued relentlessly upwards and onwards and so the government kept chopping bits off the project to save costs, regardless of the benefits lost. Super stupid.
The map shows each stage chopped by government including the North East leg to Leeds, with the final act announced by the Prime Minister Rishi Sunak at the Conservative Party Conference held in the former Manchester Central station in October 2023 in closing down the Birmingham to Manchester leg and also Old Oak Common (west London) to the half constructed terminal at Euston, so rendering HS2 as largely pointless.
The government made sure that HS2 Phase 2 to Manchester was dead by cancelling the safeguarding for the route in January 2024. Deliberate sabotage.
Green shoots start to appear after the forest fire. The scene is set
The “project is worth doing” view has been replaced by the project is “worth doing properly”. The government has deliberately burnt the bridges of resurrecting HS2 as conceived so a fresh start is needed, despite legendary mis-management of the project and woeful government sponsorship.
A reset requires re-examining what the project is for as well as a new route from the West Midlands to Manchester which addresses cost escalation as well as meeting changed objectives. Railfuture has long advocated that HS2 should be to provide additional capacity for passenger and, importantly, freight, on our rail network, rather than simply speed to specific and isolated points. Whole regions in the North and the Midlands must benefit and HS2 must be seen as part of the rail network with capacity to grow the business. This is now generally recognised.
We have a new government which has also declared it will not go back to the HS2 Phase 2 alignment between the West Midlands and Manchester. The rail industry recognises that the present project from Old Oak Common to joining the West Coast Main Line near Lichfield at Handsacre Junction is impractical operationally - Railfuture was one of the first to point this out. HS2 must go to Crewe and relieve the West Coast Main Line, not add to an already congested route at its most vulnerable point south of Stafford. It must also go to Manchester in order to achieve the business and regeneration objectives quantified in the business case.
There are also the twin issues of serving Yorkshire and the East Midlands as well as re-establishing Euston as the London terminal, with Old Oak Common serving West London properly (by new Overground stations) and also Heathrow Airport and East London via the Elizabeth Line; 10 additional trains have been ordered for this. We will be examining these issues separately.
So, enter Connecting places and driving growth
The government had lost its way with HS2 but it matters to the West Midlands and the North West (also the North East too!) The West Midlands and the North now have a voice through elected mayors.
The Mayors of Greater Manchester and the West Midlands therefore commissioned a “consortium to review the enhanced connectivity in catalysing growth, skills, and jobs across their city regions, and explore opportunities for greater private sector involvement in delivering and financing new solutions”. Implicitly in this is the need for lower cost potentially by removing project over-specification by the HS2 team and by reduced speeds.
The consortium has now published Summary and Full reports for the Midlands-North West Rail Link.
The exercise was chaired by Sir David Higgins and led by Arup with a private sector consortium, all highly respected, credible players.
The report concluded that 'doing nothing' in this corridor is not feasible from either economic or operational perspectives, a key point the previous government overlooked when cancelling HS2 to Manchester and burning boats by needlessly cancelling safeguarding. The authors avoided the unconvincing, but often tried, “we have wasted £billions so let's waste some more to rescue the project” argument. The so called 'hockey stick' - ie it all comes right from now on with me in charge – it never does!
Instead the authors started from scratch, building on what is being constructed already from the West Midlands to Old Oak Common, and making some assumptions on what will be provided north of Manchester Airport to Manchester Piccadilly and the Trans Pennine upgrade of the existing route via Huddersfield.
The report also recognises the need to promote freight growth in this key corridor albeit quoting the previous government’s unambitious target of a 75% increase in freight in the next 10 years. Railfuture's campaigning target is a doubling of freight on the network, a target objective also advocated by Tim Shoveller, CEO G&W UK/Europe which includes Freightliner.
The map has to be different than before but the key is not just the alignment of the route. It must give good connectivity to the rail network at Crewe but how it is constructed is the key, ie removing over-specification by the HS2 team.
Three strategic options were considered
The report, wisely, considers three “concept” options, having rejected 'do nothing'.
These are:
- “Patch and mend” to address major bottlenecks.
- “Build bypasses around the most constrained sections”.
- “Construct an entirely new line”.
The scope changes proposed to address this are listed as:
- Lower design speeds
- Ballasted track
- UK loading gauge (rather than European standard)
- Simplified junctions with the existing rail network
- Restoring the safeguarding cancelled by the last government.
Critical to the proposal is to reverse the decision on land safeguarding so removing the £2bn waste here. All of these have been suggested by Railfuture members during feedback on earlier articles on HS2.
The route plan is shown below, quoted as costing 65-75% of the HS2 Phase 2 scheme whilst maintaining a significant proportion of the economic benefits. (NB the percentage figure is credible although we do not know what HS2 Phase 2 would have finally cost.)
There are two proposals in the report
There are two elements: the proposal and the private sector delivery model as advocated by the proponent, ie the plan itself and governance.
The plan
This briefing focuses on the first element ie Is there a credible revised proposal in order to realise most of the benefits of the case for investment in HS2? The answer is probably yes. There is also a strong desire to see these benefits in terms of the economy in the West Midlands and the North as well a need to increase the capacity of the rail network for all users, including freight users.
It is Railfuture’s contention that the “Opportunity through Connectivity” report represents a serious proposal to be considered seriously by the new Labour government. It has Railfuture’s support. Yes there are questions, particularly about how all this works around Manchester, and also how to restore the potential benefits of HS2 to the East Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East. These need to be addressed too. Railfuture will be briefing further on these in the context of this proposal.
Governance
Few people would argue about the need for a change of governance with HS2 Ltd concentrating on completion of the already half constructed line from London to the West Midlands, albeit to a higher specification than that advocated north of the West Midlands.
The proposal is a private sector consortium composed of the proponents to build the new line in the context of effective government leadership. The Labour government has declared an inherited shortage of funds so such an approach is certainly not untenable.
The key issue with all major projects such as this is risk – who bears it and for what. Getting the balance of who bears risk will be the subject of prolonged discussion with the Treasury. There are various options for this and this proposal is a serious one, but probably not the only one given the money involved. Railfuture will be commenting on these too as detailed proposals emerge.
The King is dead, long live the King.
Midlands-North West Rail Link Summary and Full reports.
Keep HS2 options open
High Speed Rail