

***RAILFUTURE* SCOTLAND RESPONSE TO SCOTLAND RUS (2010/2011)**

Contents

RAILFUTURE SCOTLAND RESPONSE TO SCOTLAND RUS (2010/2011)	1
RUS RESPONSE	3
RESPONSE – GAPS NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE RUS	10

Introduction

Railfuture Scotland campaigns for better services and an expanded rail network for passengers and freight users. Railfuture works with other rail industry stakeholders and recognises the challenges they face. Within an unbroken campaign approaching 50 years Railfuture can be in a better position to represent rail users' interests than other stakeholders who have been subject to short-term policy constraints and policy reversals.

In terms of service the priorities are for reliability, affordable fares, appropriate timetable, economic inclusion for both passenger and freight and competitive journey times without the exclusion of individual communities.

In terms of Network Expansion, Railfuture Scotland's priorities are:-

RFS1 Dornoch Link, Ready to go in 1986 but sabotaged after the departure of ScotRail's General Manager, Chris Green, who left ScotRail later that year. A 2007 independent Consultancy report confirmed this project would achieve a 45 minutes faster / 26 miles shorter route to the main centres of population and economic activity in the north Highland mainland and Orkney.

RFS2 Glasgow Crossrail – an integral part of previous SPT / Glasgow City Council ambitions to connect the separate networks north and south of the Clyde, reduce future growth pressures on the main Glasgow termini and regenerate much of the city centre long marginalised by motorway plans. The 2006 SPT consultancy study established a robust economic and financial business case for this project.

RFS3 Glasgow Airport Rail Link – Ready to go until cancelled in 2009 by the Scottish Government (along with their cancelling of the Edinburgh Airport Rail Link during 2007). The robustness of Glasgow Airport Rail Link is still upheld by its inclusion within the Government's National Planning Strategy (NPF 2) as a 'project of national significance' meriting early implementation.

RFS4 Methil – re-opening to passengers with most of the rail route still in existence.

RFS5 St Andrews – re-opening the rail link to the Home of Golf and world famous university and tourist town whose importance to the economy is recognised

by its inclusion in both VisitScotland and Scottish Enterprise's top destinations. St Andrews now suffers pitiful car congestion whose effects can be felt as far back as Cupar, due to existing public transport not being attractive enough to entice visitors and residents out of their cars. A feasibility study is in progress.

RFS6 Kilsyth/Kirkintilloch – with turnbacks promoted at Lenzie/Croy and massive railhead park and rides the turnbacks should be located in the larger towns at present isolated from the rail network.

RFS7 Edinburgh South Suburban – restoration of passenger services on existing line.

RFS8 Grangemouth – restoration of passenger services on existing line.

RFS9 Alloa to Dunfermline – restoration of passenger services on existing line

RFS10 Kilmacolm – Last of the closures, bitterly opposed and should be re-opened.

RFS11 Local passenger services on East and West Coast Main Lines.

RFS12 Halbeath cut-off – mentioned in the STPR. Possibly the first part of a re-instated direct line to Perth, without which rail will always be out-competed by road.

RFS13 Scottish Borders/Midlothian – Completion of the Borders Line re-opening to Tweedbank, further extension beyond Tweedbank and possible extensions in Midlothian.

RFS14 Aberdeen Crossrail - A high frequency Inverurie - Aberdeen - Stonehaven rail service, with additional intermediate station, supported by the NESTRANS, to address the particular road congestion damage in Aberdeen (note in the RUS 6.6.5 *Peak capacity Aberdeen commuting* assessments 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, the partial recommendation for elements of Aberdeen Crossrail but restricted because of high infrastructure investment cost).

RFS15 A limited number of station re-openings on existing lines to include communities which pay taxes to support train services to which they do not have reasonable access.

While these expansion priorities may be considered beyond the ORR Guidelines for RUS consultation they do link into future route utilisation. The list does not include the “Committed” projects for which Railfuture has campaigned and is grateful to the rail industry stakeholders promoting them. In particular, Railfuture congratulates Network Rail for succeeding in re-opening the Airdrie to Bathgate on time and on budget. It should be noted that the Railfuture Campaign in 1999/2000 to re-open this line, with the support of West Lothian Council, was largely dismissed as “impractical” by rail and transport industry leaders at the time.

RUS RESPONSE

1. and 2. Background and Scope

The Draft Scotland RUS consists of a logical progression and this response attempts to follow the sequence as far as is practicable given the need for a concise response.

The RUS is very limited by the clear ORR Guidelines. It excludes committed projects, the STPR projects and the many other more major projects for which train user representatives campaign. Much of the RUS content is detailed and technical and is almost below the level, which would register interest with most train users. Nevertheless, there are some important concepts and some very significant details along with a host of information for which Railfuture Scotland is grateful.

While this response is aimed at the ORR Guidelines the RUS occasionally comments on matters apparently outwith the guidelines and this response will address some related items but in very brief and separate form.

While it is to be expected that the RUS must take into account detailed train formations it does so to a degree suggesting that Network Rail could be responsible for train operation rather than the often rumoured solution that, in Scotland, a favoured train operator will become responsible for the infrastructure.

The RUS is generally positive and as such is supported by Railfuture Scotland unless otherwise qualified in this response.

3. Current Capacity, Demand and Delivery

The RUS provides a mass of interesting information on capacity, demand, utilisation, performance and some very welcome infrastructure enhancements already delivered. This response is mainly concerned with Future Demand in section 5. The gaps in capacity are addressed in Section 6 but these are generally well known except, possibly surprising, is the lack of long freight looping capacity at Mossend. There is a short section on “Engineering Access”. Stakeholders are critical of the lack of a 24/7 railway. However, engineering/maintenance possessions are essential while short possessions are costly and inefficient for all users. Network Rail does have to communicate this issue more effectively to stakeholders and, at the same time, accept that investment is essential to provide a railway much closer to 24/7 capability.

4. Committed Schemes

Lists committed schemes including Airdrie to Bathgate just completed, for which Network Rail must be congratulated. These schemes are not included in the RUS. Also “Tier 3” developments mentioned which are partly in the RUS but it is not completely clear how much these relate to the RUS.

5. Future Demand

Network Rail use two models for future demand, a steady state growth, a sort of past historic, and a stronger growth based on more recent real growth rates. Network Rail is to be congratulated on this. Rail demand models have been largely discredited especially where they are applied to new services and new situations. The RUS should be prepared for much higher levels of growth although there is no certainty that strong growth will continue in all sectors and it could well be that future growth is concentrated on sectors showing lower historic growth rates.

Most demand drivers do depend on unpredictable changes in political policy at various levels, examples being the availability of rolling stock and concessionary fares policies. The RUS models tend to assume that the choice available to political leaders is much more restricted than the electorate would want.

Any effect of open access services, particularly after the limitation of competition agreement ends on the West Coast Main Line, has not been made clear.

Demand forecasting for freight is even more difficult but the RUS assumes positive growth rates for freight, especially the non-bulk sector. The level of freight does seem to depend substantially on how much the Government decides to continue to subsidise the road haulage sector. For the important coal sector the rail demand is influenced by the weakness of sterling supporting Scottish production, ocean traded coal requiring the very deep-water terminal at Hunterston and, for 2030 forecasts, political decisions on new generating stations. The RUS should not discount much higher growth levels for railfreight than predicted. The RUS does accept the requirements of freight operators to be able to operate more competitively with longer, heavier trains operating on the most direct routes but with alternative routes being made available.

The RUS provides a host of detailed statistics to support the future demand predictions across the Scottish network and in individual sectors.

6. Gaps and Options

The RUS identifies gaps and options, mainly in terms of various capacity limits, and this forms the most important part of the strategy. The consultation asks if the correct gaps are identified. This is difficult given the exclusion of committed projects, future STPR projects, issues beyond the boundary of the Scottish RUS and the ongoing implementation of 2007 RUS recommendations. Cost benefits are difficult given that many small projects in themselves do not justify funding but without them the network does not work properly (e.g. any individual freight overtaking loop). Incidentally, transferring passengers (and presumably freight) from road to rail is taken as a negative result in cost terms in that the Treasury receives less in petrol tax!

Because response is specifically asked on identification of gaps rather than in Section 7, Emerging Strategy, the main points are raised at this stage although it is difficult to separate them from strategy and other levels of network development. It is emphasised that on most points there is support for the RUS although actions always seem too restrained with, basically, only one major proposal (For the Usan track redoubling near Montrose). In both Section 6 (options subsections) and Section 7

many points made in the RUS are almost statements of the obvious or too low key to initiate much interest from actual train users.

This response attempts to follow the notation used in the RUS.

Glasgow Conurbation

- 1.1 **Paisley Corridor Capacity**, support proposals in general but would prefer explanation of how the 3-track layout is going to be worked.
- 1.2 **Ayrshire Services, remove stops at Kilwinning** – Do not support. Given an acceptable frequency then all trains should not stop at all stations but Kilwinning is a major interchange station and more complex journeys are likely to become more important in future.
- 1.3 **Argyle Line Train (not) Lengthening** – Support that beyond 6 cars it becomes almost impossible to serve the most important stations (in tunnels) and therefore lengthening is not an option (but too many trains have been running in short formations).
- 1.4 **Additional Services on Argyle Line** (and separating inner and outer services) – additional (inner) services supported. The split between inner and outer services seems restricted to 3 peak limited stop Lanark trains and therefore having relatively little impact. The “small” number of passengers disadvantaged will be very disgruntled as they already are for those Lanark services stopped short in the compromise to squeeze in Larkhall trains. Many peak passengers will benefit but Argyle Street Station is one of the higher demand stations on the network and will not be served by these trains. Splitting inner and outer services as a principle is supported by Railfuture but in this case it is more “experimental”. Redoubling Newton Junction is supported. The original singling has been described as a “Fiasco” except for the resulting fatalities. Railfuture Scotland wonders why the Newton to Carmyle trackbed is newly protected in the structure plan?
- 1.5 **Additional Capacity on the Whifflet Route** – While supporting electrification it can hardly be justified as means of increasing trains from 2 to 3 cars! Electrification would allow the trains to serve Rutherglen and the Central Low Level (although this Whifflet route should be running via Parkhead and Tollcross if that line had not been “lost”). For train lengths the RUS should openly criticise lack of rolling stock provision by others and the inflexible design of modern trains.
- 2.1 **Earlier services on the Argyle Line** – Both earlier and later services would be supported. It is not necessarily the patronage of first and last trains which counts, but that it allows passengers to use other trains as part of their return journey. It is a disappointment that deregulation and privatisation of bus services failed in their commitment to provide buses connecting reliably with last trains.
- 3.1 **Further electrification of the Glasgow Conurbation Network** – a statement of the obvious, depending on available resources given EGIP electrification. The Shotts route would be an “infill electrification” with particular benefits.

Edinburgh Conurbation

- 1.1 **Fife Train Lengthening** – Support
- 1.2 **Fife services additional stop** – support as a concept, relatively minor proposal?
- 1.3 **Extension of Prestonpans service to Drem** – support but the limitation appears to be a lack of rolling stock? It is a poor reflection if the RUS is about lack of rolling stock.
- 1.4 **North Berwick as 6-car operation** – support 6 car operation but exasperated at the issue of inflexible, incompatible rolling stock which causes the problem. Who is responsible for specifying rail vehicles too long for the service? There is also a concern about the expanding use of “SDO”. Initially this appeared to be a solution for those platforms which are completely impractical to lengthen. Now it is invoked, with safety implications, where unsuitable trains have been specified.

Strategic Gaps - Interurban

- 1.1 **Third high peak train from Stirling to Edinburgh** – support, appears to be a statement of the obvious.
- 1.2 **Weekend train lengthening** – Support this statement of the obvious but note that there are several services operating grossly overcrowded at weekends with short formations when additional stock is quite clearly available – this should not be a RUS issue.
- 1.3 **Stirling to Glasgow (Lengthening)** – support, it would be a statement of the obvious except there is clearly a Queen Street terminal capacity issue which is a RUS issue except that it has to be incorporated into EGIP.

Peak Capacity – Inverness, Aberdeen

- 2.1 **Inverness Peak Capacity**, Additional evening peak service to Dingwall – Given that no infrastructure is required it is difficult to see why this is a RUS issue. The RUS recommend against but these routes are very likely to become the higher growth routes of the future.
- 2.2 **Lengthening Aberdeen (Commuter) Services** – Difficult to see this as a RUS issue except that the recommended alternative of splitting inner and outer services could become a RUS issue. This should be passed back to operators and Transport Scotland to fulfil their responsibilities to address overcrowding.
- 2.3 **Additional Services between Dyce and Aberdeen** – a restatement of 2.2. It is supported but the necessary re-doubling is reported as prohibitive in cost and is passed on to Tier 3 (Scottish Executive responsibility?). While this is correct the importance of developing this very badly under-invested route should be strongly emphasised. Each initial investment is always prohibitive. This is not some underdeveloped rural backwater of the modern world and investment is patently available for quite massive major road building. Railfuture Scotland strongly objects to the failure to develop this rail route.
- 2.4 **Additional Service between Stonehaven and Aberdeen** – Supported and the recommendation to proceed is welcome. However, with no infrastructure requirement the running one extra train should not be a RUS issue.

- 2.5 **Create North Bay platform at Aberdeen** – Support and welcome RUS recommendation for this. Object to the reason “produce a saving for the Government”!

All day journey times and service between Regional Centres and Central Belt.

- 3.1 **Improved Journey Time/Frequency between Aberdeen and Inverness** – This is strongly supported by Railfuture Scotland. The infrastructure requirement of 4.2km track doubling, an additional loop and station rebuild is long overdue. The journey time reduction is still disappointing. It is noted that this is passed to “Tier 3” and will be reported in the final RUS. There is massive investment in the competing road link while the rail layout remains worse than it was 100 years ago.
- 3.2 **Recasting Aberdeen to Central Belt Service** journey time reduction (without infrastructure improvement) – not recommended in the RUS and not supported by Railfuture Scotland because of adverse impacts.
- 3.3 **Recasting Aberdeen to Central Belt Service** journey time reduction (with infrastructure improvement) – The RUS does not recommend this option because of high cost involved in redoubling of the line south of Montrose with some new alignment. It passes the options to Tier 3. Railfuture Scotland does support this option. This single-track section is an anomaly on the only route to Aberdeen from the Central Belt. That each individual improvement cannot be justified by the costing is well known but is no reason to continue with this poor infrastructure. However, it is appreciated that adverse topography and privately owned premises will result in a difficult project.
- 3.4 **Review of Line speeds** (Aberdeen to Central Belt) – Only small time savings were identified, at considerable cost, and is not recommended in the RUS. Railfuture Scotland reluctantly agrees in that the individual improvements will be reviewed as other work becomes necessary.
- 3.5 **Improved frequency** Glasgow to Dundee – This is not recommended in the RUS. It appears to be purely an operational and rolling stock issue rather than infrastructure.
- 3.6 **Inverness to Central Belt**, journey time and frequency improvement – Railfuture Scotland strongly support this option. Considerable infrastructure and timetable work are needed and the RUS recommends this to Tier 3.

Strategic Gaps –Rural

- 1.1.1 **Saturday crowding on Glasgow to Dumfries via Carlisle route** – This appears to be an operator’s and rolling stock issue rather than a RUS issue.
- 1.1.2 **Improved Sunday service on Glasgow to Dumfries via Carlisle route** – This appears to be an operator’s and rolling stock issue rather than a RUS issue except that access for engineering maintenance is involved. The RUS recommends extra Sunday trains and this is supported.
- 1.1.3 **Stranraer Line Service** - This is now a train operator issue. The final RUS will report on investigation by ScotRail and Transport Scotland. No infrastructure work is involved. The ferry link will, apparently, be discontinued. Railfuture Scotland campaigns for infrastructure to keep the rail to ferry link although this does not appear to be a RUS issue.

- 6.7.2 Item reviews costs of journey time improvements on rural routes concluding that the journey time improvement costs cannot be justified. Railfuture Scotland would want more detailed work before accepting this conclusion.
- 2.1 Improved rural journey times by converting (i.e. improving) level crossings, Bunchrew AOCL conversion to ABCL taken as a best case – The RUS concludes the cost is not justified by the minimal timesavings. Railfuture Scotland considers that over time safety considerations will inevitably result in conversion or elimination.

Strategic Gaps –Freight

- 1.1.1 **Doubling at Slateford Junction**, Shotts Line – The RUS recommends doubling this junction, Railfuture Scotland supports.
- 2.1 **Bi-directional Loop at Greenhill** – RUS recommends this loop proposed by freight stakeholders be added to EGIP implementation even though EGIP appears committed to major junction enhancements at Greenhill.
- 3.1 **Improvements to Mossend Freight Operation** – The RUS recommends to “Tier 3” increasing loop lengths, yard capacity and yards accesses. Railfuture supports remembering that the original Mossend Yard/Eurocentral Terminal were considerably reduced in scope to save money.
- 3.1 (2) **Gauge clearance** (to W10) for East Coast Main Line via South Edinburgh to Carstairs – This option is recommended as a combined RUS for Freight and East Coast Main Line. Supported by Railfuture Scotland.

Strategic Gaps – Network Availability

- 1.1.1 **Diverted Freight to Inverness** – The final RUS will report on this proposal which is about manning signal boxes on the night shift when the Highland Main Line is closed for engineering works.
- 1.1.2 **Overnight Service between Edinburgh and Glasgow** – The RUS does not recommend overnight services but that EGIP should progress a service starting one hour earlier in the morning. This is really an operator issue but allowing time for engineering work.
- 1.1.3 **Earlier West Coast Main Line services on Sundays** – An issue of engineering possessions which would need bi-directional signalling. The RUS recommends further investigation work over the whole route. Railfuture Scotland supports bidirectional signalling if it is required to provide a railway available more closely to 24/7/52. It would also help Lanark services which start too late on Sundays to be attractive to many train users.

Terminal Capacity

Queen Street – Lengthening more services to 6 cars would require an additional platform and provision for this is recommended. Additional concourse space may be required in future and design is recommended. Railfuture Scotland supports these recommendations but is surprised they are considered sufficient. There also must be concern about Low Level passenger platform and access capacity when Airdrie – Bathgate traffic is assimilated.

Glasgow Central – was considered adequate in capacity but that within the period lengthening of both suburban and cross-country trains would require at least an additional platform even allowing for some diversion to the Low Level. Space for an additional platform was thought to be available or that a new and separate site would be found for long distance services. Railfuture Scotland objects to a separate site, as it would conflict with integration and interconnection objectives. Railfuture Scotland believes that lengthening platforms out across the river on the line of the original viaduct will become inevitable and would ease any congestion in the station throat.

Edinburgh Waverley – The RUS considered that Waverley should be able to accommodate all normal train services and passenger circulation to the end of the period in 2030. Railfuture Scotland supports this view except that additional tracks may be required from the eastern approach and that increased frequencies on some presently well-served routes must not squeeze out services on other potential routes.

RESPONSE – GAPS NOT IDENTIFIED IN THE RUS

There are few identified gaps which are totally within the RUS guidelines. These are listed:

A1 Argyle Street Station – this station often appears close to capacity for passenger numbers. Although not necessarily a RUS funded issue the RUS should identify limits and options, in particular, direct access to street level.

A2 All busy terminals – the effect of ticket barriers on peak passenger flows, which can cause serious crowding, is a concern. Is this properly assessed and is the true effectiveness of ticket barriers meeting their objectives?

A3 Extreme Weather - In the extreme weather the previous winter lessons were to be learnt. In the extreme weather this winter some lessons are still to be learnt. The railway network cannot be expected to operate normally in all extremes of weather especially when much of the network is relatively close to capacity anyway. All users understand a train stuck in a 10 foot snowdrift. What they do not understand is that for several days the points will not work in one direction but will work normally in the other direction. The complete suspension of quite important services to allow junctions to be effectively plain-lined to run other preferred services is a serious issue and will become a more serious political issue. We may know what is behind it but Network Rail will have to be ready with answers and clear options. Additionally there is the issue of trains being left out in the open overnight in the worst weather (e.g. the new Bathgate Depot). Should there be more covered accommodation for stabling and cold weather treatment?

A4 Disaster conditions - In view of the extreme weather conditions affecting all modes of transport and with major rail terminals being able to cope with peak passenger movements while trains are frequent what thought could be given to “Heathrow” type emergencies? With just a few trains cancelled, crowds can swell to worrying proportions. The options are not easy but should thought be given to this aspect in future years?

A5 Freight Loops - Possibly included in another RUS but as well as the Mossend Loops requiring lengthening it seems more longer freight trains with modern traction are having to miss out overtaking loops because of insufficient loop length. Can we be assured that all the loops, especially on the main routes, have sufficient length for the future?

A6 Ravenstruther Mineral Terminal - Possibly covered in Tier 3 type programmes, there is the capacity issue at Ravenstruther on the West Coast Main Line where coal trains reverse on to the wrong line and proceed up the down main for a mile or so before regaining right line. Depending on exchange rates this terminal may close next year but is more than likely to operate for another fifteen years and an application has just been made for an extension of working hours. Railfuture Scotland believes a signalled trailing crossover is required at Ravenstruther.

A7 Via Carstairs - Although being progressed as part of EGIP there is important information not available on the proposed “ScotRail” Glasgow to Edinburgh via Carstairs service. The reason for this service and lack of information on station stops is not clear and it is assumed this is a Transport Scotland proposal rather than a Network Rail proposal. The Caledonian Railway gave this indirect route up in 1869 when the direct line via Shotts was opened. The main “gap” concern is whether this service will serve South Lanarkshire by calling at Carluke and Carstairs stations. Given the financial situation and Scottish Government transport objectives it would be indefensible for this service not to serve South Lanarkshire. The result of not serving these stations would be a claim for an additional “ScotRail” service to be introduced to duplicate the EGIP service but connect South Lanarkshire to Edinburgh.

A8 There is concern that there may be insufficient capacity for freight travelling between east and west through the south of Glasgow.

A9 Scenic Lines – Today nobody should say, “Railways are not in the leisure business”! The West Highland Line depends on leisure travel and more importantly the whole economy of the West Highlands depends on this and similar attractions. Therefore, it is as important as any other stakeholder requirement that the promised and world-wide acclaimed views are available to paying visitors. A tree management policy is vital and it cannot be a franchised or open access operators’ responsibility.

A10 – Glasgow to Fife – This emerges as one of the biggest service gaps not competitive by rail. EARL would have had a good potential for frequent cross-platform interconnection. With EARL cancelled what way forward is there for Glasgow to Fife train services?

A11 – Major Projects – the following projects, as listed in the “Introduction”, require major investment and considered to be excluded from the ORR RUS guidelines. However, in some cases there is route track in existence or largely in existence and could be considered as “gaps” in the RUS, as listed below:

Glasgow Crossrail (RFS2)

Methil – re-opening to passengers (RFS4)

Edinburgh South Suburban – restoration of passenger services. (RFS7)

Grangemouth – restoration of passenger services. (RFS8)

Alloa to Dunfermline – restoration of passenger services (RFS9)

Local passenger services on East and West Coast Main Lines. (RFS11)

Aberdeen Crossrail (RFS14)

A limited number of station re-openings on existing lines. (RFS15)

7. Emerging Strategy

The Emerging Strategy is an amalgam of the present draft RUS, the 2007 RUS, Committed schemes and Tier 3 projects and as such is complex to review but which Railfuture Scotland supports almost in its entirety. Points of concern are as follows

B1 Electrification – Railfuture campaigns for more electrification and this appears to be delivered with A to B and EGIP, which is a major task. Which route next?

B2 Rolling Stock - There is a concern that trains of the last 30 years are specialised, inflexible and when joined into longer trains much heavier than need be and with inconsistent policies on through corridors. It can be seen that the RUS struggles with train formations at times as well as with the general shortage of rolling stock although Scotland appears to be in a better position than England. While complaining that trains are too specialised it can be seen that in passenger accommodation there should perhaps be high density stock (as mentioned in the RUS) and also stock more suitable for the longer distance Scottish routes as frequently read in the Scottish press. Is this too much to ask?

B3 Network Availability – Railfuture Scotland understands the issues. Railways have to be maintained and with safety for passengers and personnel. The circumstances must be better publicised. All means of extending the period of network availability should be pursued. Railfuture Scotland had understood that bi-directional signalling would be progressively installed, that alternative routes would be available as far as practicable and that good driver route knowledge for alternative routes would be an essential.

B4 Access to Stations – Car parking may be subject to a separate study. Station car parking is important but in very few stations is it really significant in filling the trains. The arithmetic is obvious. A 200 space car park will not fill 2 trains and most stations now have a half hour frequency. The vast majority of passengers do not park and ride. They find other ways to get to the train. Strategies should bring the train closer to where people live. Railfuture Scotland do not support a policy of long distance rail-heading or of having to buy a car in order to use the train.

B5 Long term and Alternative growth scenarios - Railfuture Scotland appreciates these issues being raised. One related issue, mentioned perhaps only once or twice in the RUS, is that of protection against adverse development. “The Railway”, not necessarily Network Rail, and under extreme pressure from anti-rail governments, has failed to protect the future network in terms of routes, stations, lineside environment and, very importantly, engineering access to the line. As an example, Causewayhead Station was developed for residential use and then, with the railway re-activated, there were massive complaints which will probably yet cost somebody a lot of money. While some householders complain of an existing or new railway others insist on new residential build adjacent to 24/7 main lines. Engineering accesses are either developed or appropriated. Scottish Government led the way with their planning guidance to protect former railway routes, stations and accesses. It must be Network Rail’s responsibility to take a long view on the future network. Let us hope responsibility for the network is not handed over to individual train operators!

B6 High Speed 2 – Perhaps not a RUS Issue but the RUS is correct to mention it. It is difficult to imagine that the present proposals are the most practical with proposed speeds of 250mph taking it closer to the “Maglev” scenario. The practical experience of Network Rail in the specification for HS2 would give more confidence. However, there are two issues to raise:

B6/1 If HS2 goes ahead as planned and is successful then a great deal of extra traffic will spill onto the “classic” lines to Scotland. There is almost certainly going to be capacity conflict with freight, local and regional services. HS2 cannot just avoid

responsibility for any resulting damage, especially to freight services which are probably more important in economic and environmental terms. HS2 is going to have to fund additional tracks in advance of the full HS Scotland project.

B6/2 The issue of HS2 terminals, presumably in Glasgow and Edinburgh have been mentioned. HS2 trains will, to some extent, be replacements for present trains. Network Rail must have a view on the length of HS2 trains. Is it essential that HS2 trains will be long (22 car lengths)? Some of the High Speed European designs on which the proposals are modelled do, in fact, split en route, to serve dual destinations. There is a long way to go on HS2 but Scottish Government, with the help of Network Rail, should be considering routes, pinch points and terminals. In particular site investigations are recommended to find out what is beneath Edinburgh Waverley for eventual capacity increases. Haymarket is unlikely to be acceptable as a terminal but consultation should start soon. Railfuture Scotland would object to “Out of town” terminals which would encourage car use.

Notes:

AOCL/ABCL: change to a barriered automatic level crossing

EARL: Edinburgh Airport Rail Link

HS2: Proposed High Speed Rail Link from London northwards

ORR: Office of Rail Regulation

RUS: Route Utilisation Strategy

SDO: Selective Door Opening

STPR: Strategic Transport Projects Review

Tier 3: Project Development Fund for approval by Network Rail, Transport Scotland and Train Operators.

This response has been prepared by *railfuture* Scotland. The *railfuture* national Passenger Committee was also consulted.

For further information contact:

Mr. Donald MacPhee, Chairman, *railfuture* Scotland

87 Chatelherault Crescent, Hamilton, Lanarkshire, ML3 7PR

T: 01698 424671

E: donald.macphee@railfuturescotland.org.uk

www.railfuture.org.uk www.railfuturescotland.org.uk
www.railfuturewales.org.uk www.railwatch.org.uk

The Railway Development Society Limited Registered in England and Wales No: 5011634
A Company Limited by Guarantee
Registered Office: 24 Chedworth Place, Tattingstone, Suffolk IP9 2ND